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It is easy to think of  space as something outside and alien to us, as that which in its extension 
stands in contrast to the interiority of  mind, feelings, point of  view and other seemingly 
intangible aspects of  subjectivity as regularly conceived in Western culture. In this essay, I 
challenge this dualistic and inward sense of  subjectivity, demonstrating how integral space 
and spatial experience are to the very possibility and formation of  ourselves as subjects—
i.e., beings with a point of  view on others as well as on ourselves—and as agents—i.e., 
persons with choosing and meaning-making capacities.1 Indeed, I show that how we exist 
varies with how we inhabit space.
I am particularly interested here in how our agency is contained by space, but not in 
the sense in which water is in a pitcher. Rather than a limiting object, space is the extended 
situation in and through which our sense of  self  and choice becomes possible in the first 
place. This study of  the interwoven character of  personhood and spatiality coalesces with 
contemporary discussions of  agency as interpersonal, situational, and, thus, ultimately 
heteronomous. Recognizing the constitutive spatial structures of  our agency matters because 
these structures—precisely because of  their heteronomy—can oppress the very agency 
they also constitute. In other words, there are existentially healthy and unhealthy forms of  
spatial containment that variably support or restrict the range and plasticity of  our agency, 
and a failure to notice the importance of  spatial experience leaves this aspect of  our reality 
susceptible to neglect and abuse.
1 As the essay proceeds, I will explain further what I mean by agency and health. Generally speaking, 
however, my sense of  both of  these aspects of  human reality is that they are inextricably interpersonal 
and situational, and, thus, ultimately heteronomous. Throughout this essay, I will interchangeably employ 
the terms “subject,” “self ” and “person” as well as “subjectivity” and “personhood.” While there are 
discourses that parse out the differences amongst these, for my purposes, I am trying to capture in these 
terms our reality as beings that experience themselves as having a meaningful point of  view upon others 
and themselves.
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I begin the essay by considering the character of  spatial experience and the implicit 
sense of  ourselves that attends our embodied experience of  space. I propose that our 
spatiality can be understood in terms of  “containment,” articulating how there are senses 
of  both containing and being contained by space at the core of  our experience. I will then 
examine how our senses of  space and subjectivity develop hand in hand through our bodily 
practices of  movement. This theme of  movement will lead me to considerations of  how the 
“containment” that is the inherent character of  space can develop different forms of  self-other 
experience and, thus, different experiences of  agency. I will examine experiences in which 
space is explicitly noticed and felt as containment and, more specifically, as a hostile means of  
containment—namely, claustrophobia and two forms of  imprisonment; these “case studies” 
will allow me to consider, respectively, how oppressive pressures on our agency affect our 
spatiality and vice versa. These analyses will underscore how our existential health depends 
in significant part upon the presence and cultivation of  an appropriately supportive spatial 
environment. Overall, the essay will show how our formation as subjects is dependent upon 
the bodily-rooted and spatially articulated gestures through which we develop a lived sense 
of  whether the world outside us is supportive and cooperative or hostile and threatening. 
 
I. A BRIEF PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPACE AS CONTAINMENT
To set the groundwork for examining the critical role that spatiality plays in our make-
up as subjects and existentially healthy agents, let us first trace a brief  phenomenological 
description of  spatial experience.2 Kant, a key forebearer of  the phenomenological 
tradition, describes space as naming the meaningful form our experience takes. In any 
explicit experience of  space, we are, according to Kant, implicitly experiencing ourselves; 
in other words, as an object of  experience, space is “contained” in our subjectivity. But what 
specifically does it mean to identify experience as “spatial?” Kant writes, “[my] sensations 
[are] referred to something outside me . . . [and I] represent them as outside and alongside 
each other” (2003, 68, A23/B38).  Space is how I experience things as outside—as outside 
of  me and outside of  each other. Furthermore, “space is experienced as an infinite given 
magnitude”: space is given in experience as “outside me” and as “infinite” (69, A25/B39-
40). Though “logically” our experience “contains” the meaning of  space, Kant’s description 
reminds us that the very meaning of  space is that it contains us and it exceeds us infinitely. We 
experience space as that in which we are: we move about in space, perceive things in space, 
and find ourselves to be in space. In this sense, we experience space as containing us. 
2 For fuller phenomenological studies of  the character of  space, see Heidegger 1971; Husserl 1997; 
Jacobson 2006, 2009, 2010; Merleau-Ponty 2012; and Morris 2004. Ed Casey’s The Fate of  Place (1997) 
also offers an excellent history of  changing conceptions of  space and place across the history of  Western 
philosophy.
                                                      Spatiality and Agency • 56Kirsten Jacobson
Puncta    Vol. 3.2    2020
Space is also the opening in which we experience things as existing, appearing, and 
acting or being acted upon. A thing has its “room” or its “place” alongside others in a 
single shared medium. Yet, phenomenologically speaking and as already suggested in 
Kant’s arguments, space is not a further “entity” beside the things of  the world. Space is the 
coordinating context that provides the necessary distance for the emergence of  things into 
independent and articulated appearing beings; and, reciprocally, it is through things in their 
detachment from each other that space is revealed to us.3 In other words, as Husserl (1997) 
describes in his 1907 lectures, Thing and Space, “[w]hat we see are bodies, and together with 
the seen, we grasp the ‘between’ . . . . Thus space is . . . co-seen” (223). By emphasizing that 
space is co-seen with things, Husserl also highlights that it is our grasping of  the between, our 
co-seeing, that allows for the spatial array. As such, space is simultaneously the disclosing of  
our subjective articulation of  being-in-the-world and that which we experience as holding 
us and things. Space is a contained-containing.
This co-seen and contained-containing character of  space and things is readily 
recognizable in the context of  vision: to see requires a “between” that separates and connects 
a viewer from the thing viewed, for a thing immediately atop the viewer fills the visual field 
to such an extent that all vision is blocked and without a viewer there is nothing to be 
seen.4 An infinitely complete consciousness, as Husserl proposes, could not have “a” view 
on things or space; it would be completely filled in and, thus, have no room for appearance 
(1997, 98). Similar structures exist for other sense modalities. Hearing requires a resonating 
medium through which the vibrations produced by one thing can reach across and be “felt” 
and heard by a listening being; smelling occurs only if  some scent can unfurl itself  from a 
there to our perceiving here; touch implies the ability for a feeling being to work its way along 
the texture of  a thing; and taste involves a similar working through and noticing the flavors 
of  an opposing surface. Merleau-Ponty writes: “We are thus justified in saying a priori that 
all of  the senses are spatial, and the question of  knowing which sense gives us space is 
unintelligible, provided we reflect on what a sense is” (2012, 226). Space is the necessary 
context of  possibility without which appearing and, thus, “experience of” and “reflection 
on” would be impossible.
As the arena of  juxtaposition, space is also the containing field wherein a change from 
the self-identical can be made. For instance, we require a surrounding open that can be 
entered if  we are to be able to do anything. Further, Husserl argues that for something to 
appear as a distinct thing, there indeed must be movement (1997, 85). Without movement, 
there would be a flat and filled visual field—if  it could even be called that—in which nothing 
could appear as discreet: a completely full and depthless sheath would accost our “view.” 
Motion reveals what holds together in a unity and what falls apart as distinguishable, and 
3 For an excellent discussion of  an object’s possession of  a spatial background, i.e., of  being inextricably 
wound up with a background, see Ahmed (2006), especially pp. 548-9.  
4 Merleau-Ponty (1968) offers an arguably deeper discussion of  this “between” in his articulations of  the 
notion of  flesh in “The Intertwining—the Chiasm.” For related discussions of  depth, see Casey (1991) 
and Merleau-Ponty (1993).
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through our experience of  things as things, we can notice and have the sense of  the space 
in which these things are independent from their surrounding field. Space must be present 
for things to exist, but it is only in movement that this space and the things within its fold 
are able to be experienced (Morris 2004).5 Movement is, thus, a prerequisite for our ability 
to encounter space as space. Moreover, inasmuch as spatial distancing is the precondition 
of  appearance as such, it is our embodiment and our ability to move—in whatever variable 
expressions this may occur—that make experience as such possible. 
These productive and grounding aspects of  movement underscore the character 
of  space both as arising through our containing activity and also as that which is 
experienced as what contains us and gives our activity a field of  range and reference. 
As Heidegger (1962) describes, we do not initially experience the spatial world as an 
optional, objective content of  experience but rather as the inescapable practical setting 
in which our lives unfold: we exist as being-in-the-world.6 Phenomenologically, space is 
not initially an indifferent arena, but rather the place of  containment that is our manner 
of  existing, the setting intrinsically connected with our being-at-home in-the-world.7 
 
II. SPATIALITY, MOVEMENT, AND AGENCY
With this phenomenological backdrop of  the containing-contained relationship of  space 
and subjectivity, I turn now to consider how our experience of  agency is tied up with 
our spatial situation. More specifically and following the thrust of  the arguments above, I 
will examine research that shows how space functions as the home or situation in which our 
choosing and meaning-making capacities become possible in the first place, and how this 
very relationship can foster or inhibit our existential health.
Let us begin by considering phenomenological conceptions of  motor intentionality 
and agency in Husserl (1989) and Merleau-Ponty (2012). Both argue that the original 
experience of  oneself  is not an “I think” but an “I can”—that is, a lived sense—revealed in 
5 “[T]he constitution of  the Objective location and of  Objective spatiality is essentially mediated by the 
movement of  the Body, or, in phenomenological terms, by kinaesthetic sensations” (Husserl 1997, 148, 
198). For a good, contemporary account of  motor intentionality, see Evan Thompson’s Mind in Life: 
Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of  Mind (2007), especially pp. 247-49 and pp. 312-17. 
6 Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) begins with a relevant description of  our reality as “being-in-the-
world” (sections 12-14). Merleau-Ponty (2012) studies these different conceptions of  space under the 
headings of  the abstract “spatiality of  position” and the concrete “spatiality of  situation” in the chapter 
entitled “The Spatiality of  One’s Own Body and Motility” in Phenomenology of  Perception. Note that neither 
Heidegger’s nor Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of  space necessitate that we experience our spatial situation as 
nice, kind, or “homey” even if  it is our familiar “ground” (Jacobson 2006, 2009, 2010).  
7 For further discussions of  the existential characteristics of  home, being-at-home and dwelling, see both 
Heidegger (1971) and Jacobson (2009, 2010).
                                                      Spatiality and Agency • 58Kirsten Jacobson
Puncta    Vol. 3.2    2020
practice—of  one’s ability to act.8 “[M]y body,” Merleau-Ponty writes in the Phenomenology 
of  Perception, “appears to me as a posture toward a certain actual or possible task” 
(2012, 102).9 Said otherwise, we are fundamentally practical subjects, and the spatial world 
is fundamentally experienced as the arena for our possible action.10 For example, if  my aim 
is to join a gathering on an upper floor of  a building, I do not typically notice “a set of  
stairs” in a reflective manner since I experience the possibility—or even the imperative—
to climb them, and my body conforms itself  to the stairs as if  drawn through them to 
its destination.11 The thing is experienced as a summons to action and my living body is 
experienced by me as my capacity to respond.12 Both experiences are inextricably spatial 
and agential.  
Empirical research on the development of  conceptions of  space in children supports 
the phenomenological arguments that spatiality is tied up with our bodily abilities as well as 
our sense of  agency.13 The stage-setting psychological studies of  Piaget and Inhelder (1956) 
 
8 See Husserl 1989, 13-17, 159-69, 226-31, and 266-80; and Merleau-Ponty 2012, 139-40. Compare 
Noë 2004, 63. 
9 Thompson and Zahavi (2007) bring out the relationship between this “I can” and our earlier reflections 
on the motor-revelation of  things and space: “If  something appears perspectivally, then the subject to 
whom it appears must be spatially related to it. . . . To say that we perceive only one profile of  something 
while being aware of  other possible profiles means that any profile we perceive points beyond itself  to fur-
ther possible profiles. Yet this reference of  a given profile beyond itself  is equally a reference to our ability 
to exchange this profile for another through our own free movement (tilting our head, manipulating an 
object in our hands, walking around something, etc.) . . . One’s lived body is not co-given as an intentional 
object, however, but as an implicit and practical ‘I can’ of  movement and perception” (79).  
10 Compare Heidegger (1962) on the idea that affectivity (Stimmung [mood]) and Befindlichkeit [state of  
mind] are at the basis of  our experience—our self-consciousness begins in how we experience things—
their emotional colouring—rather than in a direct reflection upon ourselves (sections 28 and 29). See also 
Leder’s (1990) discussion of  the way mood shapes our experience (84-5). 
11 On this “summons” from the object, see Husserl (1989): “The Object, as it were, wants to be an Ob-
ject of  advertence, it knocks at the door of  consciousness . . . it attracts, and the subject is summoned 
until finally the object is noticed. Or else it attracts on the practical level; it, as it were, wants to be taken 
up” (231). Compare Merleau-Ponty (1963, 168-69). The strength of  this call may even “overwhelm” a 
person’s intentions. For instance, someone may pass an exit on a highway where she intended to get off 
because what Merleau-Ponty (2012) calls her “habit body” has continued on to a more regularly taken 
exit (84-9, 140-48, 288); an impressive cathedral may quiet and subdue an otherwise voluble and ener-
getic person; crowds of  people are shown to move in regular sine wave sequences of  motion when under 
certain types of  situationally-induced pressure; and, architectural features ranging from shape to color 
are shown to affect productivity, mood, the intensity and even possibilities for human action (Moussaïd, 
Helbing, and Theraulaz 2011; Profusek and Rainey 1987; Tuan 1974; and Valdez and Mehrabian 1994). 
12 For related discussions of  agency see Jacobson 2017; Jacobson and Russon 2018; Laing 1969; and 
Russon 2003, 2009. 
13 Further research also shows that spatial development in infants around twelve months of  age develop 
in relationship with their abilities for self-movement. Tracking behavior and object location in the infants 
were stronger in those infants who moved themselves. The researchers concluded that “self-produced 
movement appears to aid the infant by increasing attention to relevant environmental information” 
(Acredolo, Adams, and Goodwyn 1984, 324). They noted that their results could equally be a sign that 
being moved by adults, rather than by themselves, could in fact hinder tracking ability.
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revealed that conceptions of  space do not follow simply from the mere perception of  things 
in space. Rather, children develop an understanding of  and relationship with space through 
being involved in and learning new activities—such as being able to grasp an object, move an 
object, arrange objects, and so forth (1956, 25, 41, 449, 454).14 Kermoian and Campos (1988) 
conducted related studies testing the relationship between infants’ capacity for locomotion 
and their spatial search performance. The tests involved attracting infants’ attention to a toy 
of  interest and then concealing it to a variety of  degrees. Sometimes the toy was partially 
concealed; other times it was placed under one of  two identical cloths; still other times it 
was hidden under multiple cloths; and sometimes a delay occurred between placement and 
when infants were allowed to begin searching for the toy. The experiments were carried 
out with varied trial set-ups to study different levels and aspects of  infant locomotion. The 
results overall showed that infants’ ability to search successfully for an object of  interest is 
connected to their specific capacities for locomotion. For an infant to attain the highest 
results on the given search tasks, locomotion needed to be self-motivated and on hands and 
knees. Infants who could not yet crawl but could move “artificially” in rolling walkers did 
not achieve the levels of  spatial development possessed by self-locomotive infants; they did, 
however, show greater capacities to attend to external objects than pre-locomotive infants 
and belly crawlers (915). Locomotor-limited children did not gain the search abilities under 
study simply due to the passage of  time; rather, any increase in being able to locate a desired 
object arose only as relevant locomotive skills were developed (915). These experiments 
demonstrate that locomotion has functional consequences for spatial search abilities; in 
other words, locomotion facilitates the development of  children’s abilities to seek out and 
find an object set apart from themselves in a complex spatial array (914). These results 
correspond to the developmental studies of  Piaget and Inhelder that demonstrated that to 
achieve a generalized spatial schema—i.e., a spatial system of  integrated positions, regular 
14 Core aspects of  Piaget and Inhelder’s (1956) interpretation of  human spatial experience differ 
notably from phenomenological accounts, such as those given by Merleau-Ponty. To a large extent, they 
present their developmental picture of  spatiality as one in which the developmental endpoint of  spatial 
understanding is the “achievement” of  the Euclidean perspective. Not only does Merleau-Ponty question 
the weight placed on “spatial objectivity” by this account, but he also argues that the child’s experience 
of  space—even as Piaget and Inhelder describe it—contains important resemblances to the nature of  
adult spatial experience; in other words, as we have already begun to see in our analyses, adult spatial 
perception proves to be far less Euclidean-like than Piaget and Inhelder suppose (see also Merleau-Ponty 
2012, 317-8, 415-5). Moreover, Piaget and Inhelder focus on the child’s “conceptual” experience of  space 
as the site for examining spatial development, whereas Merleau-Ponty locates the source for examining 
spatial experience—both developmentally speaking and otherwise—as lying in the realm of  perception. 
In spite of  these differences, the analyses of  Piaget and Inhelder significantly support Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument insofar as they demonstrate the connection between spatial levels and the body’s abilities and 
activities. My analysis of  Piaget and Inhelder’s argumentation regarding the body and spatial development 
may, in fact, serve to moderate certain criticisms of  their work leveled by or implied in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy.
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distances, fixed dimensions, and so forth—children must first develop the ability to perform 
activities that would correspond to—and make possible—such a view of  space (1956, 193).15 
Research has also shown that experiences of  movement help to reveal us to ourselves 
and set up conditions that allow us to experience ourselves as agential beings. As we 
began to see above, movement is crucial for the development of  outward awareness; it 
is also critical in stimulating developing forms of  awareness of  self-other juxtapositions. 
For instance, in contrast to premotor infants, infants with some form of  locomotion react 
at a notably greater cardiac level when exposed to an experimental cliff edge; are more 
capable of  picking invariant structures out of  a mixed display; and demonstrate greater 
interest in surrounding social stimuli and unknown adults.16 Gerardi-Caulton demonstrated 
a correlation between the ability of  young children to perform spatial tasks and “their 
ability to shift attention between activities, focus attention effectively, and pay attention to 
subtle stimuli in the environment”—components of  attention that the researchers connect 
with a child’s capacity for self-regulation (2000, 403). These activities show nascent signs 
of  infants either doing something of  their own accord or reacting to something or someone 
as distinct from themselves. Such shifts toward reflectivity mark a critical step in opening 
onto a spatially thick and diversified reality as opposed to the “pre-reflective and unmediated” 
space of  infancy in which Eva Simms describes the infant as “inserted into the flesh of  the 
world” (2001, 34-35).17 As such, these spatial steps—both literal and figurative—mark a 
crucial stage when an infant begins moving out into and engaging with what is other. 
In contrast, Simms (2014) discusses how infants whose early life is spent without 
significant interactive contacts with other human beings (as has occurred in the past in 
significantly under-supported “foundling homes” or orphanages) will fail to emerge from 
an inner world of  solipsism (85). Based on a variety of  evaluations, observations and 
testimonies, Simms describes the roots of  the contracted existential reality of  a particular 
child, whom she calls Rudy, who was “raised” in such an orphanage. In his infancy, Rudy 
lived in an environment in which an absolutely bare minimum of  human contact was given; 
he was not permitted to move beyond the site of  his crib. His initially given surroundings 
were thus limited to a fairly static set of  perceptual possibilities that, additionally, were 
neither described nor manipulated in significant or novel ways by adults. Although Rudy’s 
  
15 Piaget and Inhelder (1956) identify a developmental pattern for the child’s changing conception of  
space—one that moves from the topological to the projective and, finally, to the Euclidean—and they 
ascribe this development directly to the child’s development in her abilities to accomplish various tasks 
related to motion, arrangement and organization, rotation, drawing, etc. (419). 
16 Relevant studies cited in Kermoian and Campos (1988). 
17 Simms’s (2001) argument in “Milk and Flesh” emphasizes that this original immersion in the world is 
a dyadic one—typically of  mother and infant—but not a “dyad” experienced by the infant as dualistic or 
reflective in any way. Indeed, Simms’s argument helpfully articulates the character of  our foundational 
pre-reflective spatial experience that Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes vis-à-vis the infant in “The 
Child’s Relations With Others” (1964) and vis-à-vis adults in the Phenomenology of  Perception (2012) (in 
terms of  “situated space”) and in “The Intertwining—The Chiasm” (1968) (in terms of  “flesh”). See also 
Bredlau 2008, 2010.
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capacities for engagement and world-expansion were in principle developing as his body 
grew, these capacities were never encouraged or supported by his nominal care givers at 
the orphanage. Even after his adoption (at eighteen months of  age) and in subsequent 
childhood years, Rudy’s world carried the traces of  the significant constraints in the spatial 
reality of  his early years. Simms reports:  
 
When Rudy is evaluated at the age of  three years and two months, he 
is easily overloaded by sensations and has trouble focusing; he shows 
tactile defensiveness and squirms away when his [adoptive] parents 
touch him; he drops things all the time and cannot discriminate 
shapes and textures with his fingers; he constantly crashes into 
things, even big things like chairs and cars because he does not 
know where they are in relation to his body and where his body is in 
space (proprioception), and because he easily loses his balance . . .  
(2014, 82)
 
As noted above, Simms locates the crux of  the contraction in Rudy’s world-engagement as 
a lack of  early “intimate” engagements by others. What is striking for the current argument 
is the fact that Rudy’s lack of  interpersonal engagements at a young age has impinged 
simultaneously on his spatial and agential experiences. As Simms notes: 
 
The world is a panorama spread out before him and does not break 
though the wall of  his solipsism. It does not reveal to him his own 
transcendence but only his insertion into the flow of  perceptual 
events. He is . . . caught up in the tacit meaning on the surface of  the 
world. (85, emphasis added)
 
Though Rudy notices elements of  his surroundings, he does so “. . . without ever having 
any real distance from them. He is completely submerged in his familiar perceptual world. 
He is held hostage by the very fact that we are perceptual beings” (85). Agency, movement 
and spatiality are simultaneously contracted in Rudy’s experience.18 Said otherwise, Rudy’s 
experience in infancy has altered the reach of  his embodiment of  the surrounding world, 
limiting the plasticity of  his forms of  being-in-the-world. 
In describing Rudy’s experience of  agency as contracted in this way, I am not indicating 
that he possesses a lesser degree of  agency. People’s bodies and capacities pointedly differ—
both from one another’s and even across one’s own life trajectory. The co-defining 
relationship of  body and world can also be more or less supported for particular people as 
18 Psychologists D.W. Winnicott (1971) and R.D. Laing (1969) similarly write about the intrinsic con-
nection between the young child’s outward moving developments and a sense of  familial or ontological 
security, respectively.
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well as more or less thetic at varying times in persons’ lives. For instance, spatial settings that 
are designed for those who can walk without assistance can and often do set up challenges 
or prohibitions for those who need a wheelchair or walker to move. Even though various 
experiences of  illness or disability may be challenging or may limit a person from certain 
activities, and may also indicate signs of  a failing of  society to support or address varying 
bodily capacities, in every case, people are working from the situation of  their particular 
embodiment and the affordances of  their surrounding environments. As Sharon Krause 
has argued:
 
…while the selfhood that figures in agency is robust, it should not be 
understood as singular or fixed or essential. Every self  is something 
of  a plurality containing multiple strands, some of  which may sit 
uneasily with one another. Moreover, because we exist in dynamic 
relationship with our social and material environments, we are all 
subject to change. None of  us remains perfectly identical over time. 
And because our characters evolve in connection with our changing 
circumstances, it would be wrong to think that any particular feature 
of  our subjective existence constitutes an a priori essence. (2015, 22)
 
The argument of  this essay has built towards underscoring the recognition that each 
of  us develops agency—our “I can”—as our particular bodies engage with and through 
our surrounding environments. Pointedly because this “I can” is not a given facticity of  
our existence, it can vary and also shift. For instance, phenomenological authors such as 
J.H. van den Berg (1966), Isabel Dyck (1995) and S. Kay Toombs (1987) have attended 
carefully to experiences of  chronic illness, describing the significantly intertwined changes 
of  persons’ dynamic “I can” and their experiences of  the surrounding world and the things 
within it as illness waxes or wanes. In Psychology of  the Sickbed, van den Berg describes how 
the experience of  the acutely ill person reflects a lagging “I can” in the form of  things and 
even people becoming unfathomably distant and irrelevant. Imagining the experience from 
within, he writes: “The world has shrunk to the size of  my bedroom, or rather my bed. 
For even if  I set foot on the floor it seems as if  I am entering a terra incognita” (1966, 26-27). 
Toombs emphasizes the depth of  this foundation-loss in chronic illness: “The familiar world, 
including the self, is suddenly perceived as inherently unpredictable and uncontrollable” 
(231). A flare up of  multiple sclerosis symptoms can, for example, cause an environment 
that is typically smooth and unnoticed by a person to come painfully and disruptively to the 
fore, demanding that it be dealt with before the person’s other intentions can be pursued 
(Dyck 310-312). Toombs concludes that chronic illness strikes at the essential cores of  lived 
experience, leading to “. . . the perception of  loss of  wholeness and bodily integrity, loss of  
certainty and concurrent apprehension or fear, loss of  control, loss of  freedom to act in a 
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variety of  ways, and loss of  the hitherto familiar world” (234).19 Such examples underscore 
the dynamic relationship between agency and spatial experience.20 
In this essay, I have been focusing on how agency can and will be differently articulated 
in coordination with our changing spatial circumstances. Spatial arenas in which we 
experience persistent resistance or frustration may be ones in which we need interpersonal 
or therapeutic support of  some sort; they may also be sites in which we are being oppressed 
by other persons or existential and political structures.21 In the next section, I will consider 
spatial settings that are explicitly experienced as sites of  oppressive containment. This final 
and most pointed study of  space as containment will provide tangible examples of  the 
argument that existentially healthy agency is not the guaranteed lot of  all persons by 
nature, but, rather, becomes possible only if  we are properly nurtured within and by our 
interpersonal and cultural settings. In other words, “healthy” or “unhealthy” agency is not 
rooted in given and fixed capacities, but rather quite significantly in whether our abilities 




III. WHEN SPATIALITY BECOMES AN EXISTENTIAL PRISON: 
CASE STUDIES OF INTERPERSONAL ENGULFMENT  
AND TORTUROUS IMPRISONMENT
We have seen above how our experiences of  agency are connected to a sense of  being 
contained by space in such a way that we feel sufficiently able to explore and shape 
meaning for ourselves, to have a spatial home, so to speak. In other words, the “I can” of  
the developing child occurs hand-in-hand with a developing sense of  being-at-home-in-
the-world. For instance, we saw that an infant’s movements begin to be made outward as 
other foundations become more secure; the infant explores unknown objects and people 
only upon feeling grounded in new bodily capacities; and, by contrast, an infant raised in 
impoverished interpersonal circumstances will fail to be able to do either of  these at age 
appropriate levels. I want now to consider experiences in which our inescapable spatial 
19 Fredrik Svenaeus (2011) also emphasizes the intrinsic connection between illness, embodiment and 
one’s spatial experience: “Illness is an unhomelike being-in-the-world in which the embodied ways of  
being-in of  the self  (person) have been thwarted. In illness the body shows up as an alien being (being me, 
yet not me) and this obstruction attunes the entire being-in-the-world of  the ill person in an unhomelike 
way” (337). 
20 For further studies of  shifts in spatial experience relating to differing bodily capacities, see Carel 2008; 
Charmaz 1983; Honkasalo 2000; Jacobson 2004, 2011, 2017; and Leder 1990, 2004.  
21 For instance, both van den Berg (1972) and Russon (2003) argue that mental health challenges such 
as “neurotic” or compulsive behaviors mark certain ways of  being-in-the-world that are typically 
experienced directly or indirectly as frustrating or closing down certain actions or possibilities for that 
person. Both authors also see other people (or other human resources such books, art, or therapeutic 
programs) as key to supporting a person in developing greater plasticity in those existentially contracted 
arenas.
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setting is explicitly experienced as one in which a person feels trapped or imprisoned. By 
looking at breakdowns in spatial inhabitation, we will see more deeply into the dynamic 
connection between spatiality and agency. While the fundamental intertwinement of  
expressions of  spatiality and agency has already been made emphasized in this essay, we 
will now examine the dynamic bidirectional relationship of  these existential aspects of  
our reality by considering through cases of  interpersonal engulfment how pressures on one’s 
agency can lead to inhibited experiences of  spatiality and, then, through cases of torturous 
imprisonment how restrictions on one’s spatial setting can lead to inhibited forms of  agential 
expression.
When we feel trapped, we can lose the sense of  ourselves as independent and become 
consumed by our setting. In illness, as noted above, the body is not an inconspicuous 
platform for action but becomes a conspicuous obstruction that forces itself  upon our 
attention.22 We can understand our founding relationship to space along parallel lines. 
A troubled affective sense of  home can become existentially consuming, making free 
engagement with the world impossible. I have argued elsewhere, for example, that this is 
how we should understand the experience of  agoraphobia: the agoraphobic is so threatened 
by what is other that openness to exchange with the outside becomes intolerable (Jacobson 
2004, 2011). Research has shown that this experience of  threat is regularly rooted in 
the agoraphobic’s lack of  a secure sense of  home, itself  the result of  early interpersonal 
experiences of  not being supported in the development of  the agential capacities that pertain 
to our free action (2004). Without a secure and supportive home base, the agoraphoic finds 
encounters with what is ‘other’ to be dangerous rather than liberatory, self-defeating rather 
than self-defining, sites of  abandonment rather than of  opportunity. To avoid this conflict, 
the agoraphobic often remains “at home.” Yet this “home” is equally traumatizing even if  it 
seems easier to deal with. It is an imprisoning form of  containment, rather than a supportive 
home base from which she can emerge to engage with the world. Her experience of  space, 
whether at home or beyond, is one of  exile or threat.23
We see this experience of  imprisonment arise perhaps even more pointedly in 
claustrophobia—a disorder whose main symptoms are a sense of  trappedness, suffocation, 
and loss of  control (Febbraro 1995, 349; Shafran el al. 1993). The psychoanalyst W.R.D. 
Fairbairn identifies the origins of  claustrophobia in the developmental struggles between 
identification with others and independence from others—struggles that occur especially 
in the transitional stage between infantile and mature dependence (Willoughby 2001, 921). 
Fairbairn maintains that the self  oscillates “between fears of  engulfment or confinement and 
[fears of] isolation, or between claustrophobia and agoraphobia” (921). The claustrophobic 
22 This language of  the body (and the home) as “platform” is from John Russon (2009, chapter 1). The 
language of  the “inconspicuous” and the “conspicuous” is from Heidegger (1962, section 16). 
23 On the theme of  the hostility of  the home space vis-à-vis agoraphobic and claustrophobic experience, 
see also Trigg 2017 (especially chapters 1 and 2) and 2018. 
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aspect of  the self  is that which feels vulnerable with respect to other people to whom it is 
attached; specifically, the claustrophobic person worries specifically that she will be trapped 
with this person.24 
Laing’s (1969) existential psychology offers a helpful elaboration here of  the crucial role 
of  other persons in our establishing a sense of  home. Laing argues that the development 
of  a lived sense of  oneself  as an independently real agent is accomplished only through 
the interpersonal support through which others communicate their recognition of  our 
independence.25 He describes engulfment as one characteristic way that others—typically 
parents—may hinder another’s developing sense of  autonomy. For the engulfed person, the 
interpersonal world is experienced as a smothering containment in which one is allowed 
no room for independence and self-expression, and the only viable behavioral option is 
“escape”: 
 
The main manoeuvre used to preserve identity under pressure from 
the dread of  engulfment is isolation. . . . [I]nstead of  the [healthy] 
polarities of  separateness and relatedness based on individual 
autonomy, there is the antithesis between complete loss of  being 
by absorption into the other person (engulfment), and complete 
aloneness (isolation). There is no safe third possibility of  a dialectical 
relationship between two persons, both sure of  their own ground. 
(Laing 1969, 44, emphasis added)
 
In the experience of  interpersonal engulfment, containment is not experienced in a way 
that “makes room” for the individual. Home has become a site of  threat to one’s independent 
individuality rather than an enabling site of  one’s agency. According to the psychological 
accounts addressed here as well as the larger argument of  this essay, the foundation of  a 
claustrophobic experience of  the world can be described as rooted in a form of  containment 
that structures one’s way of  being-in-the-world as inherently inhibiting. 
This analysis of  an interpersonal home environment that does not allow room for one’s 
individuality to be recognized dovetails with Raymond H. Gehl’s (1964) argument that the 
claustrophobic response marks a struggle in the development of  one’s decision-making and 
action-oriented powers such that a person feels trapped inside herself. According to Gehl, 
what the claustrophobic sees in the frightening spatial surroundings is her own fright in the 
face of  taking up the powers to act, to distinguish herself  from others, and to feel capable 
 
24 Fairbairn analyses this in terms of  the “primary attachment object,” which can also “through projective 
identification into the environment” be a tangible thing rather than a person (Willoughby 2001, 921, 
citing Fairbairn). 
25 Russon and Jacobson (2018) make a related argument regarding the significance of  interpersonal 
relationships for the development of  one’s existential health and overall ability to engage with and in the 
world.
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of  being present in a situation with another person without being overwhelmed.26 Our 
lived, affective sense of  containment—the primordial meaning of  our spatiality—is thus 
fundamentally a matter of  navigating our interpersonal boundaries, or, said otherwise, of  
our experience of  participating as individual agents in an interpersonal world.
The meaning of  our spatiality is that we are thrown outside ourselves, and thus into 
the field and care of  an interpersonal world.27 The experience of  claustrophobia reveals 
that the roots of  our ability to live as agents is interwoven with how others serve to shape 
our experience of  containment—namely, in an enabling or disabling way. Our experience 
of  ourselves as “autonomous” agents is actually one of  heteronomy: we are vulnerable to 
our experiences of  containment, and it is in our formative experiences with interpersonal 
others that our spatialized sense of  agency is initially cultivated. As a mirror image to 
this portrayal of  a troubled interpersonal cultivation of  agency, I will now consider how 
an experience of  agency can be broken down through experiences of  unhealthy spatial 
containment that is more pointedly physical or structural.
In the case of  incarceration, there are certainly elements of interpersonal effects on one’s 
agency and sense of  space. Additionally and notably, however, we also find here physical 
spatial effects shaping one’s experience of  agency and interpersonal capacities (Guenther 
2011, 2013; Leder 2004, 2016).28 It is obvious that imprisonment is a form of  containment 
that intentionally limits an agent’s ability to move about in space. The limitations imposed 
by incarceration, however, are much greater than this. Though imprisonment seems at first 
only an “external” limitation that leaves the person intact, we will see through two extreme 
examples that in fact the experience of  containment in imprisonment can bring about 
severe and troubling existential changes in imprisoned persons.29
The relationship between one’s sense of  self  and one’s spatial situation is seen clearly in 
a particularly severe form of  imprisonment that emerged in the United States penitentiary 
system in the 1980s: the “supermaximum custody unit” (Haney 2003, 128-29). Persons 
imprisoned in “supermax” units are confined in a small cell of  roughly 6 by 8 feet with a 
solid steel door as its only opening; their lighting often remains on 24 hours a day, and is not 
controllable from within the cell; they are released from the cell only a few hours per week 
for private exercise in a “dog run”; often upon release for these activities, the incarcerated 
 
26 Multiple studies of  claustrophobia have found direct connections between the feeling of  inefficacy in 
the face of  external threats and the development of  anxiety (Bandura 1988; Bolte 1996, 608-10; and 
Valentiner, Telch, and Petruzzi 1996). 
27 Thrownness (Geworfenheit) is a constitutive feature of  Dasein, according to Heidegger’s (1962) phenom-
enological description in Being and Time (sections 28, 31, and 38). See also Drew Leder’s (1990) chapter 
“The Ecstatic Body” in The Absent Body for an insightful discussion of  examples of  how we are “thrown” 
beyond ourselves in our daily existence. 
28 I am particularly grateful to the work of  both Drew Leder and Lisa Guenther for their insights on the 
topic of  imprisonment and issues of  space, agency, and mental health. 
29 See Ahmed (2018) for a related discussion of  the existential spatial constrictions arising from drone 
surveillance technologies. 
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person is first tethered from outside of  the cell by a leash and eventually placed in multiple 
restraints; finally, their interaction with other inmates and even staff is severely limited, 
and visits from others, when permitted, are typically conducted through closed-circuit 
television or teleconference (Arrigo and Bullock 2008, 624-25, 628; Haney 2003, 126). In 
this situation of  imprisonment, the incarcerated person’s spatial situation is transformed 
into one in which meaningful engagement with the world and others is eliminated. As our 
argument thus far would lead us to expect, empirical research has concluded that “there are 
few if  any forms of  imprisonment that appear to produce so much psychological trauma 
and in which so many symptoms of  psychopathology are manifested” (Haney 2003, 124).30
Craig Haney identifies characteristic pathologies developed by persons in supermax 
confinement—all of  which indicate that extreme contraction and impoverishment of  
one’s spatial setting can lead to the contraction and impoverishment of  one’s fundamental 
experience of  agency. Haney reports that persons existing in supermax imprisonment 
develop problems with self-initiation and self-control of  their behaviors; lose the ability to 
follow through on even simple goal-oriented tasks; lose a clear sense of  who they are and 
how they might fit into the world; withdraw from any possibilities to develop interpersonal 
relationships or their grounding in the world, reverting instead to a fantasy world from 
which they do not seem able to emerge; and, lastly, develop experiences of  “intolerable 
frustration,” which may develop into rage that often erupts in behaviors that increase 
the amount of  time they will be forced to spend in the very conditions leading to their 
frustration. In short, we see that the supermax-incarcerated person shows signs of  losing 
almost entirely their self-defining and other-relating capacities.
The “frequent flyer program” used at Guantanamo Bay, which involves moving 
detained persons from cell to cell such that they experience significant sleep deprivation 
and disorientation, shows similar existential effects. Here, by not allowing a person a place 
to “settle,” the spatial situation becomes an aggressive container, and space is itself  used as 
an attack on one’s very way of  being-in-the-world. In the words of  the U.S. military, this 
technique is used “to soften detainees for subsequent interrogation” and “to profoundly 
disrupt [the person’s] mental senses” (Frakt 2011; United States v. Jawad 2008, respectively).31 
In both supermax imprisonment and in the “frequent flyer program,” what begins as an 
externally imposed spatially restrictive regime ends up structuring the very shape that the 
agent is able to give to the world.
These situations of  torturous imprisonment as well as those we examined above of  
interpersonal engulfment are, then, sites of  interpersonal contact that cultivate a disabling 
experience of  containment rather than a healthy space of  being-at-home, and as such, they 
inhibit the formation of  a healthy experience of  agency. In doing so, they precisely reveal 
30 Research on this point is extensive and highly conclusive (Grassian 2006; Grassian and Friedman 1986; 
Guenther 2013; and Jackson 1983, 2001).  
31 See White (2008) for further description of  the “frequent flyer program.” 
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the vulnerability of  our agency to our lived experience of  spatiality. Similar to the effects 
we saw earlier in Simms’s (2014) account of  an infant raised in impoverished interpersonal 
circumstances, cases of  extreme psychological or physical confinement demonstrate 
that—even in adulthood—our agency is not something that belongs to an individual 
alone; rather, it is interwoven with our setting as well as with other persons. Human 
agency is always dialogic—i.e., a situated, relational, and creative shaping force of  reality.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION: CARING FOR PEOPLE INVOLVES CARING FOR SPATIALITY
This essay has emphasized how human experience involves the definitive capacity of  being 
“freed up” with respect to our surroundings, of  existing as liberated from space such that 
we can give meaning to our situation according to explicit and implicit choices either 
independently or with the cooperative support of  others. In this sense, we experience space 
as an open place in which our possibilities can unfold. Yet, even though the experience 
of  a separate but responsive world is a distinctive mark of  the experience of  agency, our 
phenomenological reflections have also shown that our paired experiences space and 
agency are developed. And, while as human beings we cannot avoid being confronted by 
agency, its development is not “perfectly” secured. Our experience of  space as the site of  
our existential containment varies with our own situational and personal wellbeing: our 
specific experience of  ourselves as agential subjects is correlated with a distinctive form of  
spatial experience that is always already defined with and through what is other. 
Recognizing that we are dependent on the support of  others and on our surroundings 
in this way does not detract from our agency. Rather, the argument of  this essay aligns 
with contemporary claims that we live by means of  a “relational autonomy” or “situated 
agency”—that is, that we are always already intertwined with others and that our agency 
emerges from our determinately situated existence.32 Indeed, the notion of  agency as auto-
nomous fails to capture our lived experience. As Kristin Zeiler argues:
 
While the term autós has come to refer to one’s own or one’s own self  in 
discussions of  autonomous choices as choices made by self-governing 
individuals, the phenomenological reasoning on the embodied self  
as being-in-the-world and the embodied self  as intercorporeally 
formed allows for an acknowledgment of  how someone’s “ownness” 
is intrinsically bound up with various dimensions of  otherness. 
Not only are embodied subjects formed in relations over time, but 
subjectivity and agency are also thoroughly dependent on the larger 
situation in which they are articulated. (2018, 98-9)
32 For relevant discussions of  the intertwined and situated character of  our autonomy and agency, see 
Jacobson (2004, 2009), Russon (2003), and van den Berg (1972). See also Slatman, Zeiler, and Devisch 
(2016) for their discussion of  the autonomy of  the bodily self  as always already heteronomous (18-19).
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María Lugones underscores the danger of  what she calls “the fiction of  effective individual 
agency”—a fiction that she argues, “. . . hides the institutional setting and the institutional 
backing of  individual potency” (2003, 210). The current study of  spatial experience 
shows that we need to be initiated—by means of  and through our bodies—into enabling 
experiences of  containment if  we are to relate in existentially responsive and creative 
manners to a world that forms the inescapable context into which we are thrown. This 
argument also suggests that it is vitally incumbent upon our primary caregivers and our 
lawmakers to develop practices and institutions that recognize this necessity and that offer 
us appropriately acknowledging and supportive environments through which to develop 
and persist as healthy human agents in the myriad forms this may occur.33 We must respect 
and respond to human agency as relational and dynamic, and our existential health as 
inherently spatial and situational. 
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